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Disentangling the impacts of industrial and global diversification on firm risk 
 
 




We examine the impact of corporate diversification on firm risk exposure from 1998 to 2016. We 
find that both global and industrial diversification mitigate idiosyncratic and world market risk 
while having a negligible impact on U.S. market risk, but the effects vary before, during, and after 
the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Before the crisis, only global diversification mitigates 
idiosyncratic risk, but it increases firms’ exposure to world market risk. During the crisis, industrial 
diversification increases idiosyncratic risk, but both types of diversification increase exposure to 
U.S. market risk. After the crisis, both types of diversification increase firms’ exposure to U.S. 
market risk but have negligible impact on idiosyncratic and world market risk. Our findings remain 
robust after we control for the potential endogeneity of the diversification decision through various 
self-selection models.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate diversification has been the subject of ongoing debate among investors and 
academics. Investors who wish to diversify their portfolios within a market or across markets can 
choose to diversify directly by creating a portfolio of firms from different industries or markets 
(homemade diversification) or diversify indirectly by investing instead in firms that are already 
diversified. Barriers to investment, including imperfectly integrated capital markets, transaction 
costs, and limited access to information, can impose impediments on homemade diversification, 
making it more efficient for investors to invest directly in diversified firms (Mathur & Hanagan, 
1983). Studies suggest that corporate diversification should lower investment risk at a fraction of 
the cost incurred by individual investors (Agmon & Lessard, 1977; Doukas & Travlos, 1988; 
Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).  
Scholars have investigated the impact of corporate diversification on various aspects of firm 
risk exposure. Rugman (1976), Brewer (1981), Fatemi (1984), Thompson (1984), Shaked 
(1986), Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994), Goldberg and Helfin (1995), Reeb et al. (1998), Stulz 
(1999), Olibe et al. (2008), and Hann et al. (2013) measure the variance of stock returns and 
systematic risk (U.S. beta). Mitton and Vorkink (2010) measure the skewness of stock returns. 
Hund et al. (2010) and Lee and Li (2012) examine the volatility of firm profitability and ROE. 
While some studies document that corporate diversification reduces systematic risk (Fatemi, 
1984; Hann et al., 2013; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994; Shaked, 1986; Stulz, 1999), other studies 
show that diversified firms have a higher systematic risk (Krapl, 2015; Olibe et al., 2008; Reeb et 




 In this paper, we investigate the impact of corporate diversification on firms’ risk exposure 
from 1998 to 2016. While previous studies either bundle industrial and global diversification or 
focus on only one of the two, this study disentangles the impacts of industrial and global 
diversification on firm risk exposure. In addition to systematic risk, we include idiosyncratic risk 
in our analysis to shed more light on various aspects of firm risk exposure. To estimate 
idiosyncratic and systematic risks of the sample firms, we employ a modified version of the 
Fama-French three-factor model instead of the one-factor market model and incorporate world 
returns (from the MSCI World Excluding U.S. index) as a fourth factor to circumvent the issue 
of incomplete modeling. We follow Heckman (1979) to address the potential endogeneity of the 
diversification decision (Campa & Kedia, 2002) through various self-selection models. Lastly, 
we check the results before, during, and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the existing 
literature on the effects of diversification on firm risk and develop our hypotheses. In Section 3, 
we describe the data and elaborate the methods. In Section 4, we report the empirical findings 
and their implications. In Section 5, we check the robustness of the results before, during, and 
after the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We conclude the paper in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Firms benefit from two forms of diversification: industrial and global. Industrial 
diversification refers to involvement in different industries (business segments), and global 
diversification refers to operating in different countries (geographic segments). Corporations can 
lower their risk exposure by expanding their operations in industries or countries where they 
currently do little business, benefiting from the inverse relation between diversification and risk. 
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To support this view, Fatemi (1984), Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994), Shaked (1986), Stulz 
(1999), and recently Hann et al. (2013) show that diversification lowers firm systematic risks. 
Hann et al. (2013) argue that the imperfect correlation of cash flows (coinsurance) among 
diversified firms reduces countercyclical deadweight costs and ultimately systematic risk. In 
contrast, studies by Reeb et al. (1998), Olibe et al. (2008), and Krapl (2015) document higher 
systematic risks and more volatile cash flows and earnings for diversified firms.  
In addition to systematic risk, a few studies provide insight into total risk and idiosyncratic 
risk exposure of diversified firms.1 Goldberg and Helfin (1995) consider systematic risk and total 
risk simultaneously and suggest that a higher degree of global diversification reduces systematic 
risk but increases total risk. Krapl (2015) shows that global diversification increases 
idiosyncratic risk and consequently total risk.  
In this study, to fill the gap in the literature, we focus simultaneously on both types of 
corporate diversification (industrial and global) as well as both types of firm risk (systematic and 
idiosyncratic). Considering the costs and benefits, we expect corporate diversification to have a 
significant impact on firm systematic and idiosyncratic risk.  
                                                 
1 Previous studies use other proxies to capture firm risk exposure. Mitton and Vorkink (2010) use 
the skewness of return distribution to proxy for risk and find that focused (single-segment) firms 
have greater skewness of returns than diversified firms. Hund et al. (2010) and Lee and Li (2012) 
use the volatility of profitability and return on equity (ROE), respectively, as proxies for risk and 
suggest that diversification reduces firm risk. However, they make no distinction between 





Hypothesis 1. Diversification has a significant impact on firm systematic and idiosyncratic risk. 
 
It is conceivable that industrial and global diversification may have different impacts on 
firms’ systematic and/or idiosyncratic risk. In industrial diversification, firms expand their 
operations into various industries in their home country to diversify their income streams. From a 
portfolio theory perspective, firms with more diversified income streams are expected to have 
lower idiosyncratic risk. In addition, we argue that the more industrial segments the firm has, the 
more it resembles the market portfolio. In that way, industrial diversification enables firms to 
track the market portfolio closely, thus reducing firm systematic risk. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Industrial diversification significantly reduces firm systematic and idiosyncratic 
risk. 
As firms expand their operations into different countries, they face many opportunities and 
challenges. On one hand, globally diversified firms diversify their income streams in global 
markets, making it easier for investors to indirectly diversify their portfolio across imperfectly 
integrated capital markets (Agmon & Lessard, 1977; Hughes et al., 1975). In addition, global 
diversification reduces risk by enhancing firms’ debt capacity (Hughes et al., 1975; Louge & 
Merville, 1972) and diminishing the probability of bankruptcy (Michel & Shaked, 1986). On the 
other hand, globally diversified firms are exposed to various economic risks including political 
risks, foreign exchange risks, unfavorable taxation, agency problems, information asymmetry, 
and management self-fulfilling prophecies (Michel & Shaked, 1986; Reeb et al., 1998).  
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Accordingly, empirical studies document mixed findings on the impact of global 
diversification on firm systematic risk. Thompson (1984) examines a sample of large UK firms 
from 1966 to 1969, and reports no significant relationship between diversification and systematic 
risk. Fatemi (1984), Shaked (1986), Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994), Stulz (1999), and Hann et 
al. (2013) show that diversification lowers firms’ systematic risks. In contrast, Reeb et al. (1998), 
Olibe et al. (2008), and Krapl (2015) find higher systematic risks for globally diversified firms. 
Reeb et al. (1998) argue that globally diversified firms are exposed to various economic risks and 
hence experience higher systematic risk, and Olibe et al. (2008) support this argument for a 
sample of firms from 2000 to 2004. Krapl (2015) studies a large sample of firms from 1980 to 
2011 and finds, in accord with previous studies, that global diversification increases systematic 
risk.  
Globally diversified firms spread their investment and their income streams across multiple 
countries. From a portfolio theory perspective, these firms are more diversified than their 
industrially diversified counterparts and should therefore have lower idiosyncratic risk. In 
addition, globally diversified firms have less resemblance to the U.S. market portfolio because 
they represent one or more segments of another market as well, and therefore should bear a 
higher U.S. market risk than industrially diversified firms.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Globally diversified firms bear higher systematic risk than industrially diversified 
firms. 
Hypothesis 4. Globally diversified firms have lower idiosyncratic risk than industrially 




3. Data and methods 
3.1. Data 
We compile our sample from the COMPUSTAT Historical Segments database over the 
period 1998–2016.2 Following Berger and Ofek (1995) and Denis et al. (2002), we exclude 
regulated financial and utility firms (primary SIC codes 6000–6999 and 4900–4999), foreign 
incorporated firms, and firm-year observations where the difference between the sum of the 
segment sales and total firm sales is greater than 1% and/or the total sales are less than $20 
million.  
 [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
3.2. Measure of firm diversification 
 We employ three alternative measures to capture and control for firms’ degree of 
diversification. First, following Denis et al. (2002), we classify firms with more than one 
business segment as industrially diversified, and firms with more than one geographic segment 
                                                 
2 Before 1998, firms reported their business segment information according to the Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.131, in which business segments were classified by 
industry codes. Such classification might result in a firm with multiple related business lines 
being classified as a single-segment firm, which in turn distorts the impact of diversification on 
firm valuation documented in previous studies (He, 2009). SFAS 14 was introduced to overcome 
the weaknesses of SFAS 131 in that business segments are now classified according to their 
contributions to the firm’s revenues and expenses. He (2009) compares pre-1998 and post-1998 
data and suggests that the post-1998 data better capture the degree of corporate diversification 
and therefore its impact on firm. 
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as globally diversified. We report the sample distribution in Table 1. The sample includes 6,357 
firms and 30,102 firm-year observations. Firms that are diversified only across different 
industries are denoted domestic multi-segment (DM) and represent 15.33% of the sample (1,066 
firms and 4,616 firm-year observations). Firms that are diversified only across different countries 
are designated global single-segment global (GS) and account for 24.90% of the sample (1,686 
firms and 7,495 firm-year observations). Firms that are diversified across different industries and 
different countries are labeled global multi-segment (GM). There are a total of 1,181 GM firms 
with 6,561 firm-year observations, representing 21.80% of the sample. Domestic firms with only 
one business segment are designated domestic single-segment (DS); these firms serve as the 
benchmark. Our sample contains 2,424 DS firms, representing 11,430 firm-year observations, or 
37.97%. The decreasing trend in the number of domestic multi-segment (DM) firms and the 
increasing trends in both global single-segment (GS) and global multi-segment (GM) firms 
indicate that firms have become more globally diversified over our sample period (Panel A). 
Additionally, we report the number of unique firms before, during, and after the financial crisis 
of 2007–2009 (Panel B).3 
 Second, we use the number of business and geographic segments to quantify firm 
diversification.  
 Third, we calculate the sales-based Herfindahl index to proxy firm diversification. The 
Herfindahl index for the ith firm in year t is computed as 
                                                 
3 Some firms may not exist in all three subperiods, so the sum of the numbers of unique firm 




𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 = ∑ (
𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
) 2,     (1) 
where SSalesit denotes the segment sales (which can be sales generated from an industrial 
segment or from a geographic segment) for firm i in year t. FSalesit is firm i's total sales across 
all reported segments in that year. Accordingly, we report the industrial-segment-sales-based 
Herfindahl index (I-HERF) and the geographic-segment-sales-based Herfindahl index (G-HERF) 
separately. For domestic single-segment firms (DS), the Herfindahl index is equal to 1, and for 
multiple-segment firms (DM, GS, and GM) the Herfindahl index is less than 1; more diversified 
firms have a smaller index (closer to 0).  
In Table 2, we report the descriptive statistics for both measures of firm diversification and 
other firm characteristics. On average, DM firms have 2.659 business segments, while GS firms 
have 3.464 geographic segments. GM firms have 2.938 business segments and 3.795 geographic 
segments. Domestic and global single-segment (DS and GS) firms have industrial-sales-based 
Herfindahl index equal to 1, since they are not industrially diversified. Similarly, geographic-
sales-based Herfindahl index is equal to 1 for domestic single-segment and multi-segment (DS 
and DM) firms, which are not operating in foreign countries. DM and GM firms have average 
business-sales-based Herfindahl indexes of 0.633 and 0.531, respectively. GS and GM firms 
have geographic-sales-based Herfindahl indexes of 0.568 and 0.564, respectively. On average, 
GM firms have more business segments than DM firms (2.938 vs. 2.659 segments) and more 
geographic segments than GS firms (3.795 vs. 3.464 segments). Diversified firms tend to have 
greater assets and market capitalization than nondiversified firms. Globally diversified firms are 
larger, more leveraged, and more profitable than industrially diversified firms. They also have 
lower capital expenditure and higher advertising expenses. 
 [INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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3.3. Measure of risk 
 The three measures of risk that we are interested in are idiosyncratic risk (firm-specific risk), 
U.S. systematic risk (U.S. market beta), and world systematic risk (world market beta). We 
employ the following modified Fama-French 3-factor model to obtain the idiosyncratic risk, U.S. 
market risk, and world market risk of each firm in the sample as follows: 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,   (2) 
 
where (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of firm i on day t; (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return 
on day t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the excess return of the small-stock portfolio over the big-stock portfolio on 
day t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of the high-book-to-market portfolio over the low-book-to-
market portfolio on day t; and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 is the difference between the returns on the MSCI 
World Index excluding the U.S. on day t and the risk-free rate in the U.S. market.4 The factors 
are obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s website.5  
The above model is estimated cross-sectionally by firm and year. captures the exposure of 
the firm to the U.S. market. β4 captures the exposure of the firm to the markets of 22 developed 
countries outside the United States. We calculate the standard deviation of residuals for each 
                                                 
4 The MSCI World Index is a broad global equity benchmark that represents large and mid-cap 
equity performance across 23 developed-country markets (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 





firm in each year and use it as the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. We multiply the daily idiosyncratic 
risk by the square root of the number of trading days in a year (√250) to obtain the annualized 
idiosyncratic risk.  
While Brewer (1981), Shaked (1986), Amit and Livnat (1988), Reeb et al. (1998), Kwok and 
Reeb (2000), and Best et al. (2004) estimate diversified firms’ risk using the one-factor market 
model (in which U.S. market return is the only explanatory variable), Stulz (1999) suggests that 
the global market factor (the excess returns of the world index over the U.S. domestic risk-free 
rate) should be included in the model to estimate the expected returns of globally diversified 
firms. Because markets have become increasingly integrated over time, even purely domestic 
firms are not immune to global market risks. Aggarwal and Harper (2010), for example, 
document significant exchange rate exposure borne by domestic firms; changes in exchange rate 
affect the cost structure of global firms, which in turn affect the competition between these firms 
and domestic firms. To capture this trend, we incorporate the excess returns on the MSCI World 
Excluding U.S. index into the model.  
3.4. Analyses of the relationship between diversification and firm risk 
 To test for the relationship between diversification and firms’ risks, in Table 3 we compare 
and contrast risk levels between different types of firms (DS, DM, GS, or GM). In Table 4 we 
also compare risk levels between groups of firms with higher vs. lower numbers of 
business/geographic segments than the sample median, and between groups of firms with higher 
vs. lower Herfindahl indices than the sample median. We employ the traditional t-test and the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum to test whether differences between the groups are significant. 
  We extend the univariate analyses to test whether the results hold in a multivariate 
framework that accounts for other factors (including unobservable ones), plus the potential 
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endogeneity of the diversification decision. We regress the calculated measures of firms’ risk on 
their diversification profiles and other control variables as follows: 
𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑁𝑀𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                (5) 
𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑁𝑀𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                (6) 
and 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑁𝑀𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                (7) 
where DMi,t , GSi,t, and GMi,t are dummy variables that take values equal to 1 if the firm is a 
domestic multi-segment firm, global single-segment firm, or global multi-segment firm, 
respectively. In addition, we also replace these three dummy variables with (1) a dummy variable 
for globally diversified firms (which can have one or many business segments), (2) number of 
business/geographic segments, and (3) business/geographic-sales-based Herfindahl indices. 
 The remaining control variables are selected following previous studies. The natural 
logarithm of market capitalization is used to control for firm size. The ratio of industry-adjusted 
total debt to total assets (DEBT) is included to control for relative financial leverage. Following 
Campa and Kedia (2002), several studies including those by Villalonga (2004), Ammann et al. 
(2012), and He (2012) show that failure to address the endogeneity of firms’ diversification 
decision can distort the empirical results. We address this issue with a two-step Heckman (1979) 
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self-selection model. We first estimate the predicted probability of the firm’s decision to 
diversify to calculate the inverse Mills ratio (INVERSEMILLi,t) and include it in the regression 
models. The predicted probability of a firm’s decision to diversify is estimated using the 
following regression: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐴𝐺1𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝐺1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 
+ 𝛽10𝑀𝐴𝐽𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑃𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .                                                                                        (8)  
 We estimate Equation 8 using a probit regression and an ordinal probit regression, 
alternatively. In the probit regression, DIVERSIFIED is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for 
industrially and/or globally diversified firms, and 0 for domestic single-segment firms, as in 
Campa and Kedia (2002). In the ordinal probit regression, DIVERSIFIED is coded to be 0 for 
domestic single-segment (DS) firms, 1 for domestic multi-segment (DM) firms, 2 for global 
single-segment (GS) firms, and 3 for global multi-segment (GM) firms. Following Campa and 
Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004), we include the following control variables. LNASSET is 
the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. LAG1EBIT is the lag of EBIT-to-sales ratio. 
LAG1CAPX is the lag of capital-expenditure-to-sales ratio. SP is the dummy variable for firms 
included in the S&P indices. NUMDIVFIRMS is the number of diversified firms in the industry. 
SALEDIVFIRMS is the percentage of sales in the industry generated by diversified firms. 
MAVOL is the natural log of the values of all mergers and acquisitions in the industry. MANUM 
is the natural log of the total number of mergers and acquisitions in the industry. GDP is real 
GDP growth. MAJOREX is a dummy variable for firms listed on major exchanges including the 
NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. DIVPAID is a dummy variable for firms that pay dividends in 
the preceding year.  
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 Idiosyncratic risk is firm specific and time persistent. Therefore, we estimate equation (5) 
using a firm fixed-effect model. We conduct the Hausman test to make sure the fixed-effect 
model is more appropriate for our data than the random-effect model.6 Unlike idiosyncratic risk, 
systematic risk is nondiversifiable; all firms are subject to U.S. market risk, and given the 
increasing integration of global markets, even domestic firms are not immune to world market 
risk. Since market risk exposure is common among all firms, cross-sectional dependence may 
become an issue. Therefore, we estimate equations (6) and (7) with Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998) to account for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-
sectional dependence between firms.7 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.  Results 
4.1. Univariate results on the relationship between diversification and risk  
 In Table 3, Panel A, we report the mean (median) of the idiosyncratic risk, U.S. market risk, 
and world market risk for each of the four groups of firms. In Panel B, we compare and contrast 
the statistics between the groups. We notice that focused firms (DS) have the highest 
idiosyncratic risk. As firms diversify, idiosyncratic risk drops significantly. Interestingly, 
globally diversified firms have less idiosyncratic risk: while global single-segment firms and 
                                                 
6 Results from the Hausman test are not reported here to conserve space.  
7 Failing to account for cross-sectional (spatial) dependence will result in inconsistently 
estimated standard errors (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998). Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are well 
calibrated when cross-sectional dependence is present (Hoechle, 2007). 
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global multi-segment firms experience average idiosyncratic risks of 0.511 and 0.405, 
respectively, domestic multi-segment firms pose higher idiosyncratic risks (0.539). These results 
are consistent with those of Best et al. (2004). 
 In contrast to the findings for idiosyncratic risk, globally diversified firms have higher market 
risk. For U.S. market risk, while domestic single-segment and multi-segment firms have the 
same level of U.S. market beta (0.781), global single-segment firms and global multi-segment 
firms have significantly higher levels of U.S. market beta (0.972 and 0.990, respectively). Our 
results are consistent with findings by Reeb et al. (1998) and Olibe et al. (2008), who document a 
higher systematic risk for multinational firms. For world market risk, global single-segment 
firms experience the highest level (0.291) and global multi-segment firms have the lowest level 
(0.145) of world market beta. Global single-segment firms have significantly higher exposure to 
world market risk than domestic multi-segment firms. Surprisingly, global multi-segment firms 
have a significantly lower exposure to world market risk than do focused, domestic multi-
segment and global single-segment firms. The results in Table 3 suggest that, compared to 
industrial diversification, global diversification brings lower idiosyncratic risk and higher U.S. 
market risk.  
 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 In Table 4, we employ alternative proxies of corporate diversification such as the number of 
business segments (in Panel A), the number of geographic segments (in Panel B), business 
Herfindahl index (in Panel C), and geographic Herfindahl index (in Panel D) to make sure that 
our results are not sensitive to the measure of corporate diversification. For each measure, we 
break the sample into two groups, above and below the median firm in the sample, and compare 
and contrast the risk measures between the high and low groups.  
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 The results in Table 4 show that diversification brings about the expected risk reductions: 
idiosyncratic risk drops significantly as the number of business/geographic segments increases 
and the business/geographic-sales-based Herfindahl index decreases. On the other hand, U.S. 
market risk increases significantly with a higher number of business/geographic segments and a 
lower business/geographic-sales-based Herfindahl index. World market risk is not statistically 
different between the two groups for any measure of diversification.  
 [INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2. Multivariate results on the relationship between diversification and idiosyncratic risk  
 In Table 5, we report the matrix of correlations between the diversification measures and 
idiosyncratic, U.S. market, and world market risk. The correlations among the variables are 
consistent with the univariate results in Tables 3 and 4.  
 [INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 In Panel B of Table 6 we report the results from the probit regressions of the diversification 
decision, from which we obtain the inverse Mills ratio. The summary statistics of the control 
variables in these regressions are reported in Panel A. The results are consistent with those of the 
ordinal probit regression, and qualitatively similar to the results reported by Campa and Kedia 
(2002). We incorporate the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the ordinal probit regression into 
later regressions of idiosyncratic and systematic risks.  
 [INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 In Table 7, we report the results from the fixed-effect regressions of idiosyncratic risks on 
firm diversification profile. The Hausman test (not reported here) shows that fixed-effect 
regression is more appropriate for our data than random-effect regression. In Model 1, the 
coefficients of the dummy variables for domestic multi-segment (-0.022), global single-segment 
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(-0.037), and global multi-segment (-0.049) firms are negative and significant, suggesting that 
corporate diversification significantly reduces the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. However, the 
magnitude of risk reduction is greater for globally diversified firms. In Model 2, the coefficient 
of the dummy variable for globally diversified firms (GS and GM firms) is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, confirming that global diversification significantly reduces the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk. In Model 3, we use the Herfindahl index to capture firms’ degree of 
diversification. The coefficient of the global Herfindahl index is positive and significant; firms 
with a higher global Herfindahl index have a lower level of global diversification and hence a 
higher idiosyncratic risk. In short, geographic diversification mitigates firm idiosyncratic risk. 
Globally diversified firms generate uncorrelated cash flows from different markets with different 
systematic risks. In contrast, industrially diversified firms receive cash flows from different 
industries in the same market, which are exposed to the same systematic risk. Therefore, global 
diversification exerts a stronger impact on firm-specific risk than industrial diversification does. 
 [INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
4.4. Multivariate results on the relationship between diversification and market risk  
 In Tables 8 and 9, we report the results from Driscoll-Kraay regressions of U.S. and world 
market risks, respectively, on firms’ diversification profile. All specifications control for firm 
and year fixed effects. In Table 8, the coefficient of the dummy variable for domestic multi-
segment firms (-0.016) is negative and significant at the 5% level, implying that industrially 
diversified firms have a lower exposure to U.S. market risk (Model 1). The dummy variable for 
globally diversified firms (0.013) is positive and significant at the 10% level, indicating that 
globally diversified firms have a higher exposure to U.S. market risk (Model 2). However, the 
coefficients on the dummy variables for global single-segment and global multi-segment firms 
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(Model 1), as well as alternative proxies for firm diversification such as the Herfindahl indices 
(Model 3) and the number of diversified segments (Model 4), are not significant. These results 
do not provide strong evidence on the impact of corporate diversification on firms’ exposure to 
U.S. market risk.  
 [INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 In Table 9, the coefficients of the dummy variables for domestic multi-segment (-0.079), 
global single-segment (-0.124), and global multi-segment (-0.189) firms are all negative and 
significant, suggesting that both types of diversification lower firms’ exposure to world market 
risk but global diversification does so more strongly (Model 1). The coefficient on the dummy 
variable for globally diversified firms (-0.123) is negative and significant, confirming that global 
diversification reduces firms’ world market risk exposure (Model 2). The coefficient of the 
industrial Herfindahl index (0.138) is positive and significant, indicating that higher industrial 
diversification mitigates the firm’s exposure to world market risk (Model 3). The coefficients of 
the variables for number of business and geographic segments are both negative and significant, 
indicating that both types of diversification mitigate the firm’s exposure to world market risk 
(Model 4). 
 In sum, we find evidence that both types of diversification mitigate idiosyncratic and world 
market risk but have a negligible impact on U.S. market risk. These results are consistent with 
the view that diversification provides operational flexibility that reduces idiosyncratic risk (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994; Markowitz, 1959) but could expose firms to a new set of risks, such as 
political/regulatory risk (Shaked, 1986) and foreign exchange risk (Bartov et al., 1996), 
increasing systematic risk. 




5. The role of the financial crisis of 2007–2009  
Studies document that financial crises can change the costs and benefits associated with 
diversification. While Meyer and Rose (2003) find evidence that global diversification reduced 
the impact of the Asian financial crisis, Schwebach et al. (2002) argue that global diversification 
had less value in the highly correlated markets of their sample countries following the Asian 
financial crisis. 
In this section, we examine the impact of the financial crisis of 2007–2009 on the relations 
between corporate diversification and firm risk exposure. We divide our sample into three 
subperiods: before 2007, during 2007–2009, and after 2009. All specifications control for firm 
and year fixed effects. Table 10 reports the results for idiosyncratic risk. Before 2007, the 
coefficients of global single-segment (-0.033), global multi-segment (-0.045), and globally 
diversified firms (-0.037) and the global Herfindahl index (0.085) are significant at the 1% level, 
providing strong evidence that global diversification significantly reduces idiosyncratic risk 
before the crisis. Between 2007 and 2009, the coefficient of the industrial Herfindahl index (-
0.045) is significant at the 5% level, suggesting that firms with less industrial diversification 
have less idiosyncratic risk during the crisis. After 2009, none of these coefficients are 
significant. That is, before the crisis, global diversification significantly mitigated firm 
idiosyncratic risk; during the crisis, industrial diversification significantly contributed to firm 
idiosyncratic risk; and after the crisis, corporate diversification did not play a significant role.  
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 11 reports the results for U.S. market risk. Before 2007, neither industrial nor global 
diversification has a significant impact on U.S. market risk. However, between 2007 and 2009, 
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the coefficients of the industrial (-0.068) and global (-0.082) Herfindahl indexes are negative and 
significant at the 1% level, providing evidence that lower degrees of both industrial and global 
diversification significantly lessen U.S. market risk. After 2009, the coefficients of domestic 
multi-segment (0.034) and global single-segment (0.037) firms are positive and significant, 
suggesting that both industrial and global diversification significantly increase U.S. market risk. 
Overall, the results in Table 11 suggest that during and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009, 
both industrial and global diversification significantly increase firms’ exposure to U.S. 
systematic risk.  
[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 12 reports the results for world market risk. Before 2007, the significant coefficients of 
industrial Herfindahl index (0.103) and global Herfindahl index (-0.266) suggest that firms’ 
exposure to world market risk increases with a lower degree of industrial diversification and 
decreases with a lower degree of global diversification. Between 2007 and 2009, the coefficients 
of global multi-segment firms (-0.192), the industrial Herfindahl index (0.281), and the global 
Herfindahl index (0.799) are significant, indicating that industrial and global diversification 
reduces the firm’s exposure to world market risk. After 2009, none of the coefficients are 
significant. Overall, results in Table 12 provide strong evidence that before the financial crisis of 
2007–2009, industrial and global diversification have opposite impacts on world market risk: 
firms’ exposure to world market risk decreases with industrial diversification but increases with 
global diversification. In contrast, during the crisis, both industrial and global diversification 
reduce firms’ exposure to world market risk.  
 To summarize, we find evidence that the impact of corporate diversification on firm risk is 
not homogenous before, during, and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Before the crisis, 
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global diversification mitigates idiosyncratic risk but increases firms’ exposure to world market 
risk. During the crisis, industrial diversification increases idiosyncratic risk, while both types of 
diversification increase U.S. market risk but decrease world market risk. After the crisis, both 
types of diversification increase firms’ exposure to U.S market risk, but their impact on 
idiosyncratic and world market risk is negligible. These results support the view that global 
diversification is more desirable before the crisis because it reduces idiosyncratic risk. However, 
both types of diversification are less desirable during and after the crisis because they enhance 
firm’s exposure to U.S. market risk (Raffestin, 2014; Schwebach et al., 2002). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 Studies document mixed evidence on the impact of corporate diversification on firm risk 
exposure. In theory, diversified firms’ operational flexibility coupled with access to various 
industries and countries should reduce their risk exposure (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Markowitz, 
1959). However, globally diversified firms’ operations in various countries expose them to a new 
set of risks such as political/regulatory risk (Shaked, 1986) and foreign exchange risk (Bartov et 
al., 1996). Among empirical studies, some document a lower systematic risk (Fatemi, 1984; 
Hann et al., 2013; Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994; Shaked, 1986; Stulz, 1999), while others find a 
higher systematic risk (Krapl, 2015; Olibe et al., 2008; Reeb et al., 1998), a higher idiosyncratic 
risk, and a higher volatility of cash flows and earnings (Krapl, 2015) for diversified firms.  
 We find evidence that both industrial and global diversification mitigate idiosyncratic and 
world market risk but have a negligible impact on U.S. market risk. These results are consistent 
with the view that diversification provides operational flexibility that reduces idiosyncratic risk 
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(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Markowitz, 1959). Our results remain robust after we control for the 
potential endogeneity of the diversification decision through various self-selection models. 
 In addition, we find evidence that the impact of corporate diversification on firm risk is not 
homogenous before, during, and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Our results support the 
view that global diversification is more desirable before the crisis because it reduces 
idiosyncratic risk. However, given today’s highly integrated global capital markets, common 
asset holding between industrially and globally diversified firms increases systematic U.S. 
market risk exposure during and after the crisis, making corporate diversification less desirable 
when it is needed most (Raffestin, 2014; Schwebach et al., 2002).  
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Table1   
Sample distribution. 
Panel A: Number of firm-year observations 
Year Domestic single-segment firms  Domestic multi-segment firms Global single-segment firms Global multi-segment firms Total 
1998 1,232 (52.60%) 360 (15.37%) 461 (19.68%) 289 (12.34%) 2,342 
1999 955 (45.13%) 364 (17.20%) 448 (21.17%) 349 (16.49%) 2,116 
2000 894 (43.38%) 323 (15.67%) 461 (22.37%) 383 (18.58%) 2,061 
2001 775 (41.60%) 286 (15.35%) 431 (23.13%) 371 (19.91%) 1,863 
2002 707 (39.59%) 269 (15.06%) 446 (24.97%) 364 (20.38%) 1,786 
2003 673 (39.17%) 257 (14.96%) 430 (25.03%) 358 (20.84%) 1,718 
2004 664 (38.83%) 248 (14.50%) 443 (25.91%) 355 (20.76%) 1,710 
2005 605 (37.07%) 233 (14.28%) 435 (26.65%) 359 (22.00%) 1,632 
2006 594 (36.67%) 248 (15.31%) 437 (26.98%) 341 (21.05%) 1,620 
2007 588 (37.76%) 221 (14.19%) 396 (25.43%) 352 (22.61%) 1,557 
2008 606 (38.97%) 240 (15.43%) 338 (21.74%) 371 (23.86%) 1,555 
2009 541 (37.18%) 202 (13.88%) 392 (26.94%) 320 (21.99%) 1,455 
2010 498 (36.51%) 182 (13.34%) 362 (26.54%) 322 (23.61%) 1,364 
2011 447 (34.76%) 188 (14.62%) 329 (25.58%) 322 (25.04%) 1,286 
2012 416 (33.12%) 194 (15.45%) 330 (26.27%) 316 (25.16%) 1,256 
2013 367 (29.76%) 213 (17.27%) 334 (27.09%) 319 (25.87%) 1,233 
2014 342 (27.85%) 184 (14.98%) 352 (28.66%) 350 (28.50%) 1,228 
2015 305 (25.35%) 202 (16.79%) 343 (28.51%) 353 (29.34%) 1,203 
2016 221 (19.79%) 202 (18.08%) 327 (29.27%) 367 (32.86%) 1,117 
Total 11,430 (37.97%) 4,616 (15.33%) 7,495 (24.90%) 6,561 (21.80%) 30,102 
Panel B: Number of unique firms 
Period Domestic single-segment firms  Domestic multi-segment firms Global single-segment firms Global multi-segment firms Total           
All 2,424 38.13% 1,066 16.77% 1,686 26.52% 1,181 18.58% 6,357 
Before 2007 2,098 40.21% 904 17.33% 1,213 23.25% 1,002 19.21% 5,217 
2007–2009 518 23.78% 347 15.93% 758 34.80% 555 25.48% 2,178 
After 2009 654 26.88% 408 16.77% 735 30.21% 636 26.14% 2,433 
Notes: The sample period is 1998–2016. Domestic single-segment firms are firms that have only one business segment located in the United States. Domestic multi-segment firms 
are firms with more than one business segment located in the United States. Global single-segment firms are firms with a segment located globally. Global multi-segment firms are 




Table 2  
Descriptive statistics. 
  Domestic single-segment firms Domestic multi-segment firms Global single-segment firms Global multi-segment firms 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
# of business segments 1.000 1.000 2.659 2.000 1.000 1.000 3.795 3.000 
# of geographic segments 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 3.464 3.000 2.938 3.000 
Industrial Herfindahl index 1.000 1.000 0.633 0.610 1.000 1.000 0.531 0.512 
Global Herfindahl index 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.568 0.542 0.564 0.537 
Market capitalization ($ million) 1,660.490 209.146 2,598.120 334.233 5,692.060 640.066 7,131.250 1,118.460 
Assets ($ million) 1,519.910 229.431 2,731.280 379.108 4,497.790 516.034 5,506.760 1,148.300 
Debt/asset 0.535 0.498 0.539 0.534 0.495 0.465 0.540 0.532 
Capital expenditure/sales 0.117 0.034 0.075 0.033 0.072 0.035 0.052 0.032 
EBIT/sales -0.005 0.057 0.066 0.071 0.040 0.080 0.085 0.088 
R&D/sales 0.120 0.001 0.048 0.010 0.115 0.057 0.058 0.028 
Advertising/sales 0.037 0.016 0.028 0.012 0.032 0.013 0.027 0.011 
Notes: This table provides the summary statistics of the characteristics of the 29,986 sample firm-year observations from 1998–2016. Market capitalization and assets are 





Table 3   
Comparisons of risk measures among diversified firms. 
Panel A: Risk by diversification profile 
  N Idiosyncratic risk U.S. market beta World beta 
Domestic single-segment firms (DS) 11,429 0.623 0.781 0.288 
     
Domestic multi-segment firms (DM) 4,414 0.539 0.781 0.245 
     
Global single-segment firms (GS) 7,893 0.511 0.972 0.291 
     
Global multi-segment firms (GM) 6,226 0.405 0.990 0.145 
Panel B: Comparison of risk by diversification profile 
    Idiosyncratic risk U.S. market beta World beta 
DM vs. DS Mean diff -0.084 0.000 -0.044 
 t-stat -12.37*** 0.01 -1.48 
 Wilcoxon stat -16.53*** 0.57 -1.43 
     
GS vs. DS Mean diff -0.113 0.191 0.003 
 t-stat -22.15*** 24.22*** 0.12 
 Wilcoxon stat -20.15*** 23.52*** 0.38 
     
GM vs. DS Mean diff -0.219 0.209 -0.144 
 t-stat -43.99*** 26.88*** -6.15*** 
 Wilcoxon stat -43.57*** 26.04*** -4.13*** 
     
GS vs. DM Mean diff -0.028 0.191 0.046 
 t-stat -22.21*** 2.21** 5.95*** 
 Wilcoxon stat -24.12*** 4.05*** 4.38*** 
     
GM vs. DM Mean diff -0.134 0.209 -0.100 
 t-stat -20.4*** 21.51*** -3.35*** 
 Wilcoxon stat -20.76*** 21.77*** -1.97** 
     
GM vs. GS Mean diff -0.106 0.018 -0.146 
 t-stat -11.66*** 21.91*** -3.55*** 
  Wilcoxon stat -18.76*** 21.84*** -2.13** 
30 
 
Notes: We compare and contrast the average (median) idiosyncratic risk, U.S. domestic market risk, and world market risk among the 29,986 sample firm-year 
observations from 1998 to 2016, grouped by their diversification profile. Domestic single-segment firms are firms that have only one business segment located in the 
United States. Domestic multi-segment firms are firms with more than one business segment located in the United States. Global single-segment firms are firms with a 
segment located globally. Global multi-segment firms are firms with more than one business segment and more than one geographic segment. We employ the following 
modified Fama-French 3-factor model to obtain the idiosyncratic risk, U.S. market risk, and world market risk of each firm in the sample: 
 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  , 
  
where (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of firm i on day t; (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return on day t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the excess return of the small-stock portfolio over 
the big-stock portfolio on day t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the excess return of the high-book-to-market portfolio over the low-book-to-market portfolio on day t; and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 is the 
difference between the returns on the MSCI World Excluding U.S. index on day t and the risk-free rate in the U.S. market. The factors are obtained from Professor 
Kenneth French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The above model is estimated cross-sectionally by firm and year. 
captures the exposure of the firm to the U.S. market. β4 captures the exposure of the firm to the world markets outside the U.S. We calculate the standard deviation 
of residuals for each firm in each year and use it as the idiosyncratic risk of the firm. We multiply the daily idiosyncratic risk by the square root of the number of trading 





Table 4   
Comparison of risk by diversification degree. 
Panel A: Comparison by number of business segments 
 
Low number of business 
segments (N=19,323) 
High number of business 
segments (N=10,0640) 
Difference 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean diff Median diff t-stat Wilcoxon stat 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.577 0.468 0.460 0.357 -0.117 -0.111 -28.58*** -33.59*** 
U.S. market beta 0.859 0.855 0.904 0.923 0.044 0.068 7.12*** 8.42*** 
World beta 0.290 0.145 0.186 0.075 -0.104 -0.069 -5.54*** -4.3*** 
Panel B: Comparison by number of geographic segments 
 
Low number of geographic 
segments (N=15,844) 
High number of geographic 
segments (N=14,119) Difference 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean diff Median diff t-stat Wilcoxon stat 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.600 0.475 0.464 0.372 -0.136 -0.103 -34.1*** -33.59*** 
U.S. market beta 0.781 0.768 0.980 0.977 0.199 0.210 32.99*** 32.51*** 
World beta 0.276 0.132 0.227 0.104 -0.050 -0.028 -1.67* -1.57 
Panel C: Comparison by business Herfindahl index 
 Low Herfindahl (N=10,627) High Herfindahl (N=19,336) Difference 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean diff Median diff t-stat Wilcoxon stat 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.460 0.357 0.577 0.468 0.117 0.111 28.53*** 33.59*** 
U.S. market beta 0.904 0.923 0.859 0.855 -0.044 -0.068 -7.12*** -8.41*** 
World beta 0.185 0.075 0.290 0.145 0.105 0.070 5.6*** 4.34*** 
Panel D: Comparison by firm geographic Herfindahl index  
 Low Herfindahl (N=14,111) High Herfindahl (N=15,852) Difference 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean diff Median diff t-stat Wilcoxon stat 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.464 0.372 0.600 0.475 0.136 0.103 34.06*** 33.54*** 
U.S. market beta 0.980 0.978 0.781 0.768 -0.199 -0.210 -32.99*** -32.5*** 
World beta 0.227 0.105 0.276 0.131 0.049 0.027 1.62 1.53 
 
Notes: We compare and contrast idiosyncratic risk, U.S. domestic market risk, and world market risk among the 27,906 sample firm-year observations from 1998 to 2016. We break 
down the sample according to whether a firm-year observation has higher or lower value than the sample median value in terms of number of business segments (in Panel A), 
number of geographic segments (in Panel B), business-sales-based Herfindahl index (in Panel C), and geographic-sales-based Herfindahl index (in Panel D). Business/geographic-
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sales-based Herfindahl index is the sum of the squared ratios of each business/geographic segment of a firm to its total sales. We employ the following modified Fama-French 3-
factor model to obtain the idiosyncratic risk, U.S. market risk, and world market risk of each firm in the sample: 
 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
  
where (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of firm i on day t; (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return on day t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the excess return of the small-stock portfolio over the big-stock 
portfolio on day t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the excess return of the high-book-to-market portfolio over the low-book-to-market portfolio on day t; and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡  is the difference between the returns 
on the MSCI World Excluding U.S. index on day t and the risk-free rate in the U.S. market. The factors are obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The above model is estimated cross-sectionally by firm and year. captures the exposure of the firm to 
the U.S. market. β4 captures the exposure of the firm to world markets outside the U.S. We calculate the standard deviation of residuals for each firm in each year and use it as the 
idiosyncratic risk of the firm. We multiply the daily idiosyncratic risk by the square root of the number of trading days in a year (√250) to obtain the annualized idiosyncratic risk. *, 





























# of bus 
segments 






Idiosyncratic risk 1                     
U.S. beta 0.002 1 
         
World beta 0.167*** -0.103*** 1 
        
DS firms 0.193*** -0.138*** 0.017*** 1 
       
DM firms 0.00391 -0.073*** -0.002 -0.326*** 1 
      
GS firms -0.042*** 0.109*** 0.014*** -0.469*** -0.249*** 1 
     
GM firms -0.189*** 0.111*** -0.034*** -0.402*** -0.213*** -0.307*** 1 
    
# of bus segments -0.176*** 0.058*** -0.032*** -0.476*** 0.394*** -0.363*** 0.619*** 1 
   




0.168*** -0.055*** 0.030*** 0.506*** -0.380*** 0.386*** -0.692*** -0.885*** -0.216*** 1 
 
Global Herfindahl 0.186*** -0.209*** 0.007 0.617*** 0.327*** -0.524*** -0.456*** -0.175*** -0.797*** 0.205*** 1 
 
Notes: We report the matrix of correlations between firm diversification variables and risk measures of the 27,906 sample firm-year observations from 1998 to 2016. We employ the 
following modified Fama-French 3-factor model to obtain the idiosyncratic risk, U.S. market risk, and world market risk of each firm in the sample: 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
where (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of firm i on day t; (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return on day t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the excess return of the small-stock portfolio over the big-stock 
portfolio on day t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the excess return of the high-book-to-market portfolio over the low-book-to-market portfolio on day t; and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 is the difference between the 
returns on the MSCI World Excluding U.S. index on day t and the risk-free rate in the U.S. market. The factors are obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The above model is estimated cross-sectionally by firm and year. captures the exposure of the firm 




idiosyncratic risk of the firm. We multiply the daily idiosyncratic risk by the square root of the number of trading days in a year (√250) to obtain the annualized idiosyncratic risk. 
DS Firms, DM Firms, GS Firms, and GM Firms are the dummy variables for the types of diversification the firm is involved in. Domestic single-segment (DS) firms are firms that 
have only one business segment located in the United States. Domestic multi-segment (DM) firms are firms with more than one business segment located in the United States. 
Global single-segment (GS) firms are firms with a segment located globally. Global multi-segment (GM) firms are firms with more than one business segment and more than one 
geographic segment. Business/geographic-sales-based Herfindahl index is the sum of the squared ratios of each business/geographic segment of a firm to its total sales. * indicates a 





Table 6  
Probit regressions of diversification decision. 
Panel A: Summary statistics of the control variables employed in the probit regressions 
 Domestic single-segment firms Domestic multi-segment firms Global single-segment firms Global multi-segment firms 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
% of diversified firms in the industry 13.014 12.195 17.604 15.213 17.620 16.124 19.492 18.103 
% of sales in the industry generated by diversified firms 22.267 20.960 26.892 24.717 28.712 27.279 30.206 28.636 
Volume of mergers and acquisitions in the industry 37,481.18 8,771.92 39,801.81 8,887.66 47,479.68 28,806.81 43,433.66 17,398.14 
Number of mergers and acquisitions in the industry 79.283 29.000 75.623 27.000 108.161 64.000 79.291 47.000 
Real GDP growth (%) 0.603 0.670 0.638 0.659 0.502 0.593 0.598 0.593 
 
 Domestic single-segment firms Domestic multi-segment firms Global single-segment firms Global multi-segment firms 
 N % of the subsample N % of the subsample N % of the subsample N % of the subsample 
Number of firms in S&P index 709 2.374 316 1.058 1,407 4.711 1,445 4.838 
Firms listed on a major exchange 9,119 30.533 3,767 12.613 7,238 24.235 5,830 19.521 
Firms that paid dividends last year 4,664 15.616 2,334 7.815 3,452 11.558 3,617 12.111 
Panel B: Probit regressions of the diversification decision 
  
Model 1—Probit 
Dependent variable = dummy for diversified firms 
Model 2—Ordered probit  
Dependent variable = dummy for each diversification profile 
  Coef t-stat Marginal effect Coef t-stat Marginal effect 
Ln of total assets 0.664 29.347 *** 0.063 0.257 33.603 *** -0.060 
Lagged EBIT/sale -0.010 -0.585 0.000 -0.005 -0.649 0.000 
Lagged capital expenditure/sale -0.030 -1.805 * -0.002 -0.016 -2.262 ** 0.002 
Dummy for firms in S&P index 0.124 5.558 *** 0.067 0.045 6.551 *** -0.060 
% diversified firms in the industry 1.015 40.763 *** 2.122 0.289 38.625 *** -1.484 
% of sales in the industry generated by diversified firms 0.110 4.955 *** 0.144 0.061 8.268 *** -0.195 
Ln of volume of mergers and acquisitions in the industry 0.199 9.847 *** 0.000 0.069 10.342 *** 0.000 
Ln of number of mergers and acquisitions in the industry 0.347 17.790 *** 0.001 0.122 18.349 *** 0.000 
Real GDP growth -0.462 -6.977 *** -18.830 -0.133 -6.327 *** 13.274 
Firms listed on a major exchange 0.192 11.671 *** 0.103 0.080 13.296 *** -0.106 
Firms that paid dividends last year 0.033 1.902 * 0.012 0.008 1.302 -0.007 
Constant -1.728 -18.442 ***  1.606 22.348 ***  
Constant    2.038 28.270 ***  
Constant    2.884 39.664 ***  
       
Observations 29,616   29,616 
 
 





LR Chi-squared  5938     6520     
 
Notes: In Panel A, we report the summary statistics of control variables employed in the probit regressions in Panel B. The dependent variable is the dummy variable for whether the firm is diversified or not. In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is the dummy variable, coded 0 for DS firms, 1 for DM firms, 2 for GS firms, and 3 for GM firms. Domestic single-segment (DS) firms are firms that have only one business segment located in the United States. 
Domestic multi-segment (DM) firms are firms with more than one business segment located in the United States. Global single-segment (GS) firms are firms with a segment located globally. Global multi-segment (GM) firms are 
firms with more than one business segment and more than one geographic segment. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 7  
Fixed-effect regressions of idiosyncratic risk on firm diversification profile. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dummy for DM firms -0.022     
(-1.997**)    
Dummy for GS firms -0.037     
(-3.454***)    
Dummy for GM firms -0.049     
(-4.123***)    
Dummy for globally diversified firms  -0.034   
 (-3.569***)   
Industrial Herfindahl index   0.020  
  (1.459 )  
Global Herfindahl index   0.086  
  (4.174***)  
# of bus segments    -0.007 
   (-2.327**) 
# of geo segments    -0.007 
   (-3.599***) 
Ln of asset -0.075 -0.075 -0.074 -0.074  
(-12.269***) (-12.397***) (-12.254***) (-12.269***) 
Debt ratio 0.348 0.346 0.348 0.346  
(14.770***) (14.710***) (14.752***) (14.673***) 
Capital expenditure / sales -0.038 -0.030 -0.037 -0.036 
(-0.577 ) (-0.451 ) (-0.564 ) (-0.539 ) 
R&D expenditure / sales 0.324 0.327 0.334 0.332 
(2.342**) (2.368**) (2.425**) (2.407**) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 
 (-9.931***) (-9.890***) (-9.975***) (-9.906***) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.123 0.137 0.148 0.141 
(1.956*) (2.167**) (2.344**) (2.239**) 
Constant 0.857 0.852 0.739 0.860 
 (21.769***) (21.822***) (16.139***) (22.108***) 
     
F-statistics 142.300*** 151.600*** 147.600*** 146.600*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.249 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 
Number of observations 29,430 29,430 29,430 29,430 
Rho 0.786 0.781 0.762 0.592 
 
Notes: We employ the following modified Fama-French 3-factor model to obtain the idiosyncratic risk of each firm in the 
sample: 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
where (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of firm i on day t; (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return on day t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the 
excess return of the small-stock portfolio over the big-stock portfolio on day t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the excess return of the high-book-
to-market portfolio over the low-book-to-market portfolio on day t; and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 is the difference between the returns on 
the MSCI World Excluding U.S. index on day t and the risk-free rate in the U.S. market. The factors are obtained from 
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Professor Kenneth French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The 
above model is estimated cross-sectionally by firm and year. captures the exposure of the firm to the U.S. market. β4 
captures the exposure of the firm to world markets outside the United States. We calculate the standard deviation of 
residuals for each firm in each year and use it as the idiosyncratic risk of the firm. We multiply the daily idiosyncratic risk 
by the square root of the number of trading days in a year (√250) to obtain the annualized idiosyncratic risk. Domestic 
single-segment (DS) firms are firms that have only one business segment located in the U.S. Domestic multi-segment 
(DM) firms are firms with more than one business segment located in the United States. Global single-segment (GS) firms 
are firms with a segment located globally. Global multi-segment (GM) firms are firms with more than one business 
segment and more than one geographic segment. The dummy for globally diversified firms captures global single-segment 
(GS) and global multi-segment (GM) firms. The inverse Mills ratio is obtained from the model in Panel B of Table 6. *, **, 




Table 8  
Driscoll-Kraay regressions of U.S. market risk on firm diversification profile. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dummy for DM firms -0.016    
(-2.033**)    
Dummy for GS firms 0.005    
(0.624 )    
Dummy for GM firms 0.009    
(0.729 )    
Dummy for globally diversified firms  0.013   
 (1.725*)   
Industrial Herfindahl index   0.002  
  (0.106 )  
Global Herfindahl index   0.007  
  (0.260 )  
# of bus segments    -0.005 
   (-1.447 ) 
# of geo segments    0.001 
   (0.122 ) 
Ln of asset 0.125 0.125 0.126 0.126  
(8.847***) (8.996***) (8.668***) (8.866***) 
Debt ratio -0.123 -0.124 -0.123 -0.123  
(-4.270***) (-4.270***) (-4.271***) (-4.217***) 
Capital expenditure / sales 0.546 0.548 0.544 0.541 
(4.531***) (4.499***) (4.537***) (4.494***) 
R&D expenditure / sales 0.278 0.279 0.281 0.279 
(1.230 ) (1.223 ) (1.228 ) (1.223 ) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 
(5.861***) (5.857***) (5.830***) (5.837***) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.121 -0.107 -0.107 -0.109 
(-1.294 ) (-1.129 ) (-1.145 ) (-1.162 ) 
Constant 0.255 0.249 0.240 0.253 
 (3.017***) (2.941***) (2.052**) (3.058***) 
     
F-statistics 6.54*** 6.54*** 6.54*** 6.54*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.445 0.445 0.445 0.445 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 
Number of observations 29,430 29,430 29,430 29,430 
 
Notes: In this table we report the results from the OLS regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors of firms’ U.S. 
market risk. We employ the following modified Fama-French 3-factor model to obtain the U.S. market risk of each firm 
in the sample: 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
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where (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of firm i on day t; (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return on day t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the 
excess return of the small-stock portfolio over the big-stock portfolio on day t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the excess return of the high-
book-to-market portfolio over the low-book-to-market portfolio on day t; and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 is the difference between the 
returns on the MSCI World Excluding U.S. index on day t and the risk-free rate in the U.S. market. The factors are 
obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The above model is estimated cross-
sectionally by firm and year. captures the exposure of the firm to the U.S. market. Domestic single-segment (DS) 
firms are firms that have only one business segment located in the United States. Domestic multi-segment (DM) firms 
are firms with more than one business segment located in the United States. Global single-segment (GS) firms are firms 
with a segment located globally. Global multi-segment (GM) firms are firms with more than one business segment and 
more than one geographic segment. The dummy for globally diversified firms captures global single-segment (GS) and 
global multi-segment (GM) firms. The inverse Mills ratio is obtained from the model in Panel B of Table 6. *, **, and 




Table 9   
Driscoll-Kraay regressions of world market risk on firm diversification profile. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dummy for DM firms -0.079     
(-2.079**)    
Dummy for GS firms -0.124     
(-2.388**)    
Dummy for GM firms -0.189     
(-3.608***)    
Dummy for globally diversified firms  -0.123    
 (-2.850***)   
Industrial Herfindahl index   0.138  
  (3.353***)  
Global Herfindahl index   0.106   
  (0.882 )  
# of bus segments    -0.027  
   (-3.213***) 
# of geo segments    -0.027  
   (-2.069**) 
Ln of asset -0.111 -0.113 -0.112 -0.111  
(-2.718***) (-2.802***) (-2.699***) (-2.736***) 
Debt ratio 0.548 0.542 0.546 0.540  
(4.997***) (4.925***) (4.871***) (4.824***) 
Capital expenditure / sales -0.038 0.000 -0.014 -0.023 
 (-0.076 ) (0.001 ) (-0.028 ) (-0.046 ) 
R&D expenditure / sales 1.261 1.275 1.269 1.293 
 (1.404 ) (1.423 ) (1.416 ) (1.450 ) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 
 (-3.007***) (-2.977***) (-2.999***) (-2.993***) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.611 -0.574 -0.548 -0.554  
(-1.845*) (-1.640 ) (-1.521 ) (-1.544 ) 
Constant 0.639 0.627 0.361 0.656 
 (2.610***) (2.588***) (1.015 ) (2.694***) 
     
F-statistics 1.59*** 1.55*** 1.54*** 1.55*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.0728 0.0728 0.0727 0.0728 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 
Number of observations 29,430 29,430 29,430 29,430 
Notes: We employ the following modified Fama-French 3-factor model to obtain the world market risk of each firm in the 
sample: 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
where (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of firm i on day t; (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return on day t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the 
excess return of the small-stock portfolio over the big-stock portfolio on day t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the excess return of the high-book-
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to-market portfolio over the low-book-to-market portfolio on day t; and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 is the difference between the returns on 
the MSCI World Excluding U.S. index on day t and the risk-free rate in the U.S. market. The factors are obtained from 
Professor Kenneth French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The 
above model is estimated cross-sectionally by firm and year. β4 captures the exposure of the firm to the world markets 
outside the United States. Domestic single-segment (DS) firms are firms that have only one business segment located in the 
United States. Domestic multi-segment (DM) firms are firms with more than one business segment located in the United 
States. Global single-segment (GS) firms are firms with a segment located globally. Global multi-segment (GM) firms are 
firms with more than one business segment and more than one geographic segment. The dummy for globally diversified 
firms captures global single-segment (GS) and global multi-segment (GM) firms. The inverse Mills ratio is obtained from 
the model in Panel B of Table 6. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 10   
Fixed-effect regressions of idiosyncratic risk on firm diversification profile before, during, and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
  Before 2007 2007–2009 After 2009 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dummy for DM firms -0.004   0.028   -0.008   
 (-0.326 )   (1.233 )   (-0.295 )   
Dummy for GS firms -0.033   -0.054   -0.005   
 (-3.132***)   (-1.487 )   (-0.225 )   
Dummy for GM firms -0.045   -0.031   -0.028   
 (-3.547***)   (-0.804 )   (-1.143 )   
Dummy for globally diversified firms  -0.037   -0.057   -0.011  
 (-3.900***)   (-1.657*)   (-0.649 )  
Industrial Herfindahl index   0.011   -0.045   -0.010 
  (0.505 )   (-2.061**)   (-0.310 ) 
Global Herfindahl index   0.085   0.070   0.008 
  (3.507***)   (0.924 )   (0.215 ) 
Ln of asset -0.060 -0.060 -0.060 -0.213 -0.213 -0.214 -0.062 -0.063 -0.063 
(-7.916***) (-7.946***) (-7.880***) (-6.502***) (-6.514***) (-6.571***) (-4.312***) (-4.374***) (-4.393***) 
Debt ratio 0.338 0.337 0.338 0.385 0.384 0.385 0.298 0.298 0.298 
(12.14***) (12.14***) (12.12***) (4.851***) (4.845***) (4.856***) (7.604***) (7.573***) (7.564***) 
Capital expenditure / sales -0.079 -0.076 -0.082 -0.514 -0.525 -0.516 -0.240 -0.237 -0.237 
(-1.023 ) (-0.981 ) (-1.053 ) (-2.050**) (-2.106**) (-2.059**) (-1.846*) (-1.820*) (-1.818*) 
R&D expenditure / sales 0.252 0.253 0.265 -0.278 -0.274 -0.283 0.074 0.087 0.092 
(1.787*) (1.800*) (1.871*) (-0.538 ) (-0.532 ) (-0.546 ) (0.380 ) (0.450 ) (0.474 ) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
(-7.397***) (-7.380***) (-7.421***) (-1.389 ) (-1.413 ) (-1.404 ) (-4.873***) (-4.862***) (-4.845***) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.076 0.077 0.084 0.266 0.270 0.252 0.198 0.200 0.203 
(0.936 ) (0.950 ) (1.040 ) (2.511**) (2.657***) (2.465**) (1.688*) (1.699*) (1.720*) 
Constant 0.807 0.807 0.707 1.641 1.655 1.619 0.700 0.701 0.698 
 (16.78***) (16.88***) (12.47***) (7.416***) (7.478***) (6.977***) (7.183***) (7.217***) (6.780***) 
          
F-statistics 118.40*** 133.40*** 124.70*** 114.70*** 134.50*** 121.50*** 18.86*** 21.66*** 19.92*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.248 0.248 0.248 0.411 0.410 0.410 0.0624 0.0621 0.0621 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 3,715 3,715 3,715 1,911 1,911 1,911 1,903 1,903 1,903 
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Number of observations 16,398 16,398 16,398 4,368 4,368 4,368 8,664 8,664 8,664 
Notes: We employ the following modified Fama-French 3-factor model to obtain the idiosyncratic risk of each firm in the sample: 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(2), 
where (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of firm i on day t; (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return on day t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the excess return of the small-stock portfolio over the big-
stock portfolio on day t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the excess return of the high-book-to-market portfolio over the low-book-to-market portfolio on day t; and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 is the difference 
between the returns on the MSCI World Excluding U.S. index on day t and the risk-free rate in the U.S. market. The factors are obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s 
website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The above model is estimated cross-sectionally by firm and year. captures the 
exposure of the firm to the U.S. market. β1 captures the exposure of the firm to the world markets outside the United States. We calculate the standard deviation of residuals 
for each firm in each year and use it as the idiosyncratic risk of the firm. We multiply the daily idiosyncratic risk by the square root of the number of trading days in a year 
(√250) to obtain the annualized idiosyncratic risk. Domestic single-segment (DS) firms are firms that have only one business segment located in the United States. Domestic 
multi-segment (DM) firms are firms with more than one business segment located in the United States. Global single-segment (GS) firms are firms with a segment located 
globally. Global multi-segment (GM) firms are firms with more than one business segment and more than one geographic segment. The dummy for globally diversified 
firms captures global single-segment (GS) and global multi-segment (GM) firms. The inverse Mills ratio is obtained from the model in Panel B of Table 6. *, **, and *** 




Table 11   
Driscoll-Kraay regressions of U.S. market risk on firm diversification profile before, during, and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
  Before 2007 2007–2009 After 2009  
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dummy for DM firms -0.014   0.035   0.034   
 (-0.960 )   (1.685 )   (3.828***)   
Dummy for GS firms -0.012   -0.008   0.037   
 (-1.525 )   (-0.668 )   (2.908**)   
Dummy for GM firms -0.016   0.008   0.030   
 (-2.057*)   (0.618 )   (2.122*)   
Dummy for globally diversified firms  -0.009   -0.018   0.022  
 (-1.052 )   (-1.025)   (1.818 )  
Industrial Herfindahl index   -0.002   -0.068   -0.062 
  (-0.071 )   (-7.250***)   (-1.870*) 
Global Herfindahl index   0.032   -0.082   -0.043 
  (1.437 )   (-4.417***)   (-0.925 ) 
Ln of asset 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.092 0.031 0.090 0.071 0.072 0.070 
(15.071***) (15.130***) (14.790***) (2.235 ) (5.325**) (2.813***) (2.651**) (2.690**) (2.756***) 
Debt ratio -0.206 -0.206 -0.206 0.337 0.006 0.337 0.029 0.031 0.029 
(-5.016***) (-5.000***) (-5.409***) (6.436**) (0.742 ) (7.761***) (0.417 ) (0.446 ) (0.459 ) 
Capital expenditure / sales 0.442 0.445 0.443 -0.557 -0.036 -0.548 0.024 0.022 0.021 
(2.005*) (2.006*) (2.161**) (-2.248 ) (-1.207 ) (-2.709***) (0.170 ) (0.154 ) (0.159 ) 
R&D expenditure / sales 0.164 0.168 0.172 0.568 0.260 0.550 -0.887 -0.880 -0.864 
(0.648 ) (0.655 ) (0.716 ) (2.779 ) (3.669*) (3.343***) (-2.536**) (-2.484**) (-2.622***) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.027 0.027 0.027 -0.006 0.002 -0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
(4.651***) (4.668***) (4.982***) (-1.470 ) (5.132**) (-1.754*) (0.897 ) (0.898 ) (1.007 ) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.069 0.080 0.083 0.163 0.014 0.125 -0.102 -0.112 -0.108 
(0.660 ) (0.739 ) (0.816 ) (1.573 ) (1.399 ) (2.112**) (-0.498 ) (-0.552 ) (-0.577 ) 
Constant 
0.044 0.039 0.008 0.105 0.291 0.241 0.411 0.417 0.525 
(0.531 ) (0.449 ) (0.069 ) (0.375 ) (7.673**) (1.080 ) (2.094*) (2.127*) (2.737***) 
          
F-statistics 4.61*** 4.34*** 4.34*** 4.97*** 4.96*** 43.65*** 6.75*** 6.75*** 6.75*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.450 0.429 0.429 0.636 0.635 0.949 0.559 0.559 0.559 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Number of firms 3,715 3,715 3,715 1,911 1,911 1,911 1,903 1,903 1,903 
Observations 16,398 16,398 16,398 4,368 4,368 4,368 8,664 8,664 8,664 
Notes: We employ the following modified Fama-French 3-factor model to obtain the U.S. market risk of each firm in the sample: 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(2), 
where (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of firm i on day t; (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return on day t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the excess return of the small-stock portfolio over the big-
stock portfolio on day t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the excess return of the high-book-to-market portfolio over the low-book-to-market portfolio on day t; and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 is the difference 
between the returns on the MSCI World Excluding U.S. index on day t and the risk-free rate in the U.S. market. The factors are obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s 
website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The above model is estimated cross-sectionally by firm and year. captures the 
exposure of the firm to the U.S. market. Domestic single-segment (DS) firms are firms that have only one business segment located in the United States. Domestic multi-
segment (DM) firms are firms with more than one business segment located in the United States. Global single-segment (GS) firms are firms with a segment located 
globally. Global multi-segment (GM) firms are firms with more than one business segment and more than one geographic segment. The dummy for globally diversified 
firms captures global single-segment (GS) and global multi-segment (GM) firms. The inverse Mills ratio is obtained from the model in Panel B of Table 6. *, **, and *** 





Table 12   
Driscoll-Kraay regressions of world market risk on firm diversification profile before, during, and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
 Before 2007 2007–2009 After 2009  
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dummy for DM firms -0.045   -0.022   -0.169   
 (-1.902*)   (-0.338 )   (-1.292 )   
Dummy for GS firms -0.035   -0.039   -0.166   
 (-0.616 )   (-0.437 )   (-1.241 )   
Dummy for GM firms -0.063   -0.192   -0.134   
 (-1.566 )   (-2.345**)   (-0.854 )   
Dummy for globally diversified firms  -0.031   -0.016   -0.089  
 (-0.643 )   (-0.714)   (-0.815 )  
Industrial Herfindahl index   0.103   0.281   0.037 
  (2.628***)   (5.821***)   (0.245 ) 
Global Herfindahl index   -0.266   0.799   0.331 
  (-2.576**)   (3.299***)   (1.260 ) 
Ln of asset -0.215 -0.216 -0.222 -0.211 0.031 -0.218 0.061 0.057 0.059 
(-5.874***) (-5.859***) (-6.21***) (-1.987 ) (5.325**) (-2.58***) (0.956 ) (0.864 ) (1.018 ) 
Debt ratio 0.538 0.537 0.529 1.071 0.006 1.077 -0.013 -0.024 -0.025 
(3.478***) (3.478***) (3.606***) (4.986**) (0.742 ) (6.093***) (-0.075 ) (-0.149 ) (-0.161 ) 
Capital expenditure / sales -0.250 -0.237 -0.204 0.104 -0.036 0.106 -0.141 -0.132 -0.132 
(-0.348 ) (-0.331 ) (-0.301 ) (0.147 ) (-1.207 ) (0.190 ) (-0.171 ) (-0.158 ) (-0.171 ) 
R&D expenditure / sales 3.039 3.050 3.012 2.168 0.260 2.220 -1.582 -1.617 -1.639 
(2.162*) (2.163*) (2.267**) (1.080 ) (3.669*) (1.312 ) (-1.570 ) (-1.649 ) (-1.769*) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.030 0.002 -0.031 -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 
(-1.925*) (-1.899*) (-1.992**) (-1.626 ) (5.132**) (-2.020**) (-1.803 ) (-1.800 ) (-1.949*) 
Inverse Mills ratio -1.265 -1.235 -1.278 -1.308 0.014 -1.415 0.287 0.336 0.348 
(-3.180**) (-3.191**) (-3.50***) (-2.147 ) (1.399 ) (-2.441**) (0.433 ) (0.492 ) (0.555 ) 
Constant 1.244 1.232 1.403 1.259 0.291 0.394 -0.085 -0.119 -0.458 
 (4.888***) (4.988***) (4.848***) (2.007 ) (7.673**) (1.315 ) (-0.188 ) (-0.273 ) (-1.337 ) 
          
F-statistics 1.41*** 1.41*** 1.41*** 1.38*** 1.38*** 44.51*** 1.37*** 1.37*** 1.37*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.0844 0.0841 0.0843 0.143 0.142 0.951 0.0762 0.0762 0.0762 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
48 
 
Number of firms 3,715 3,715 3,715 1,911 1,911 1,911 1,903 1,903 1,903 
Number of observations 16,398 16,398 16,398 4,368 4,368 4,368 8,664 8,664 8,664 
Notes: We employ the following modified Fama-French 3-factor model to obtain the world market risk of each firm in the sample: 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
where (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of firm i on day t; (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return on day t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the excess return of the small-stock portfolio over the 
big-stock portfolio on day t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the excess return of the high-book-to-market portfolio over the low-book-to-market portfolio on day t; and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑡 is the 
difference between the returns on the MSCI World Excluding U.S. index on day t and the risk-free rate in the U.S. market. The factors are obtained from Professor 
Kenneth French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The above model is estimated cross-sectionally by firm and year. 
β4 captures the exposure of the firm to the world markets outside of the U.S. Domestic single-segment (DS) firms are firms that have only one business segment located in 
the United States. Domestic multi-segment (DM) firms are firms with more than one business segment located in the United States. Global single-segment (GS) firms are 
firms with a segment located globally. Global multi-segment (GM) firms are firms with more than one business segment and more than one geographic segment.  The 
dummy for globally diversified firms captures global single-segment (GS) and global multi-segment (GM) firms. The inverse Mills ratio is obtained from the model in 
Panel B of Table 6. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
